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Abstract	
This	article	examines	 the	ways	 in	which	offenders1	are	 required	 to	provide	very	particular	
accounts	 of	 themselves	 and	 to	 self‐narrate	 in	 confined	 ways.	 Drawing	 on	 ethnographic	
fieldwork	and	interviews	conducted	in	the	New	South	Wales	justice	system,	it	explores	how	
the	 stories	 that	 offenders	 are	 made	 to	 accept	 and	 tell	 about	 themselves	 often	 bear	 little	
relationship	to	their	own	reflections.	It	analyses	how,	despite	the	expectations	of	judges	and	
prison	 authorities,	 these	 self‐narratives	 are	 not	 products	 of	 an	 offender’s	 soul‐searching	
concerning	 his2	 past	 actions	 and	 experience;	 rather	 they	 are	 products	 of	 an	 official	 legal	
narrative	being	imposed	on	an	offender	whose	capacity	to	own	and	enact	such	a	narrative	is	
already	seriously	compromised.		
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Introduction	
Several	years	ago,	a	young	man	in	a	prison	in	New	South	Wales	was	re‐applying	for	parole.3	He	
had	recently	had	it	revoked	for	breaching	the	conditions	of	his	release,	namely	missing	meetings	
with	 his	 parole	 officer	 and	 failing	 to	 attend	 a	 therapeutic	 program.	 Now,	 at	 a	 public	 court	
hearing,	 he	 appeared	 (via	 audio‐video	 link	 from	 prison)	 before	 the	 State	 Parole	 Authority	 of	
New	 South	Wales,	 while	 his	 counsel	 argued	 for	 his	 re‐release.	 Through	 his	 lawyer,	 the	 court	
learnt	that	the	inmate	arrived	to	meet	his	parole	officer,	waited	for	several	hours,	but	the	officer	
never	 appeared.	 It	 also	 learnt	 that	 he	 did	 not	 attend	 the	 Managing	 Emotions	 therapeutic	
program	because,	on	one	day,	his	car	broke	down,	and	on	another,	he	had	to	attend	a	funeral.	At	
the	end	of	the	evidence,	the	parole	chairperson	asked	the	man	if	there	was	anything	he	would	
like	to	add.	‘Um...’,	the	man	said,	with	the	look	of	panic	people	get	when	they	know	something	is	
expected	 of	 them,	 but	 they	 are	 not	 sure	what.	 ‘I’m	 really	 sorry	 for	what	 I	 done?’,	 he	 offered,	
meekly.	The	parole	board	retired	 for	a	 few	minutes	before	returning	to	court	and	announcing	
that	the	man’s	application	for	re‐release	was	rejected.		
	
At	 the	 time	 this	 prisoner	 was	 applying	 for	 parole,	 another	 inmate	 in	 another	 prison	 in	 New	
South	Wales	 was	 reflecting	 on	 his	 own	 sentence.4	 Ten	 years	 earlier,	 in	 a	 sentencing	 hearing	
before	 a	 District	 Court	 judge,	 he	 had	 been	 sentenced	 for	 a	 serious	 offence	 involving	 ethnic,	
cultural	and	class	dimensions.	Two	gangs	of	young	people	had	clashed,	an	echo	of	the	cultural	
clashes	happening	elsewhere	in	Sydney	at	the	time.	A	man	was	critically	injured.	The	young	man	
who	was	sentenced	was	seen	as	a	ringleader	and	accordingly	received	a	harsh	punishment,	in	
comparison	to	his	co‐offenders	who	had	accepted	a	plea	and	cooperated	with	police.	The	young	
offender’s	oppositional	stance	and	non‐acceptance	of	 responsibility	did	not	endear	him	to	 the	
court.	 The	 judge	 announced:	 ‘You	 are	 a	 violent	 young	 man	 and	 I	 see	 no	 potential	 for	
rehabilitation	at	all.’	The	prisoner	was	19	years	old.	A	decade	on,	he	reported	that	 the	 judge’s	
words	sent	him	into	a	deep	despair.	The	picture	painted	of	him	in	the	sentencing	comments	in	
no	way	reflected	the	complexity	of	the	offence	and	his	feelings	about	it.	‘I’m	not	that	man,	not	at	
all’,	 he	 said.	 The	 narrative	 of	 him	 and	 the	 offence,	 crafted	 to	 obtain	 a	 conviction,	 and	 to	 fit	 a	
chaotic	 incident	with	conflicting	and	 complicated	evidentiary	elements	 into	 the	 constraints	of	
the	 court	 environment,	 had	 become	 a	 barrier	 to	 him	 accepting	 any	 responsibility	 for	 the	
incident.	 And	 yet	 in	 prison,	 he	 had	been	 repeatedly	 pressured	 to	 provide	 authorities	with	 an	
account	of	himself	that	fitted	an	acceptable	legal	narrative	that	he	did	not	accept.	
	
This	 article	 critically	 analyses	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 constructed	 narratives	 about	 the	 offender	
become	 central	 and	 determining	 factors	 during	 in‐court	 processes,	 throughout	 prison,	 and	 in	
the	overall	lived	experience	of	offenders.	It	contends	that	the	narratives	that	offenders	are	made	
to	accept	and	tell	about	themselves	in	the	criminal	justice	system	often	bear	little	relationship	to	
their	own	memories	and	reflections.	It	shows	how,	despite	the	expectations	of	judges	and	prison	
authorities,	these	offender	self‐narratives	are	not	products	of	an	offender’s	own	soul‐searching	
concerning	 his	 past	 actions	 and	 experience:	 rather,	 they	 are	 products	 of	 an	 official	 legal	
narrative	being	 imposed	on	an	offender	whose	 capacity	 to	 own	 and	enact	 such	 a	narrative	 is	
already	seriously	compromised.		
	
The	 article	 draws	 on	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 and	 interviews	 carried	 out	 by	 both	 authors	 in	
separate	 contexts	 in	 the	 New	 South	Wales	 criminal	 justice	 system	 between	 2009‐2013:	 Hall	
with	 prisoners	 5	 and	 Rossmanith	 with	 judges,	 lawyers,	 victims,	 post‐release	 prisoners,	 and	
parole	 authority	members.6	We	 argue	 that	 the	 justice	 system	 is	 replete	with	 expectations	 for	
offenders	to	provide	very	particular	accounts	of	themselves:	that	is,	to	self‐narrate	in	confined	
ways.	 Consider	 the	 two	 opening	 accounts:	 in	 the	 first	 example,	 the	 prisoner	was	 expected	 to	
produce	 an	 acceptable	 account	 of	 himself,	 of	 what	 he	 had	 done,	 and	 of	 his	 accompanying	
remorse.	‘Acceptable’,	in	this	context,	involved	a	properly	performed	self‐narrative	founded	on	
the	legally	agreed‐upon	facts	of	his	case.	In	the	second,	the	man	spent	his	whole	prison	sentence	
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fighting	against	a	definition	of	himself	that	gave	the	prison	system	no	incentive	to	rehabilitate	
him.	
	
From	 the	police	 investigation	onwards,	 ‘the	offence’	 and	 the	psychosocial	narrative	about	 the	
offender	 is	 constructed	and	 imposed	on	the	offender	 for	 the	duration	of	his	 ‘journey’	 through	
the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Drawing	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘lived	 sentence’	 (Hall	 2014),	 we	
demonstrate	 how	 this	 constructed	 narrative	 is	 imposed	 on	 the	 offender	 through	 in‐court	
processes	and	throughout	their	time	in	prison.	These	stories	–	what	we	call	‘imposed	stories’	–	
are	 sutured	 to	 the	 offender.	McConville	 et	 al.	 (1991)	 have	 shown	how	 the	 facts	 of	 a	 case	 are	
created	outside	the	offender,	separate	from	him	or	her,	as	a	document	to	gain	a	conviction.	We	
build	on	this	notion	to	show	how	the	offender	is	then	expected	to	attach	themselves	to	–	in	other	
words,	 to	 own	 –	 the	 official	 narrative	 of	 police	 facts.	 On	 sentence,	 further	 psychosocial	
narratives	 about	 the	offender	help	 solidify	 the	account	 to	 form	 the	official	 story	 to	which	 the	
prisoner	must	adhere.	For	prisoners,	some	of	whom	have	negotiated	the	welfare	and	criminal	
justice	 system	 since	 they	 were	 children,	 their	 personal	 history	 becomes	 a	 collection	 of	
acceptable	narratives.		
	
Furthermore,	the	criminal	justice	system	expects	a	level	of	narrative	competence	on	the	part	of	
defendants	and	offenders.	An	offender’s	‘successful	journey’	through	court	and	prison	is	largely	
based	on	their	capacity	to	self‐narrate.	Offenders	must	not	only	accept	the	stories	imposed	on	
them;	 they	 must	 perform	 these	 stories.	 Once	 incarcerated,	 for	 instance,	 offenders	 are	
persistently	required	to	‘give	good	narrative’;	that	is,	to	successfully	achieve	release	they	must	
fully	 accept	 the	 official	 account	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	 psychosocial	 account	 which	 has	 been	
constructed	 about	 them	 as	 people.	 For	 those	 offenders	 engaged	 in	 offence‐specific	 programs,	
the	 enactment	 of	 acceptance	 of	 responsibility,	 remorse	 and	 redemption	 is	 strongly	 related	 to	
their	 success	 in	 getting	 parole.	 We	 examine	 the	 ways	 the	 inmate’s	 adoption	 of	 acceptable	
narratives	 plays	 out	 in	 the	 passage	 of	 that	 prisoner	 through	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 and	
consider	how	prisoners	see	these	obligations	and	the	difficulties	they	experience	in	determining	
and	negotiating	the	expectations	placed	upon	them	by	criminal	justice	processes.		
	
Throughout	this	article,	we	explore	examine	the	ways	in	which	narratives	are	co‐constructed	by	
those	who	listen	to	them,	asking:	how	are	they	received	by	judicial	decision‐makers	and	parole	
authority	 members?	 And	 what	 are	 the	 qualities	 that	 resonate	 with	 the	 feelings	 of	 judges	
(Rossmanith	2015)	in	matters	such	as	remorse	or	attitudes	towards	the	offence?	We	argue	that,	
when	it	comes	to	authorities	making	decisions	about	offenders,	those	offenders’	own	stories	and	
story‐telling	 tactics	are	crucial	 factors.	As	Arthur	Frank	(2010:	3)	writes	 in	his	book	on	socio‐
narratology:	‘Stories	work	with	people,	for	people,	and	always	stories	work	on	people,	affecting	
what	 people	 are	 able	 to	 see	 as	 real’.	 Scholars,	 mainly	 in	 philosophy	 and	 psychology,	 have	
examined	 the	 role	 of	 autobiographical	memory	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 narrative	 of	 self	 (see	
MacKenzie	2010).	What	happens,	though,	when	a	person	is	forced	to	produce	a	self‐history	that	
is	not	really	his?	
	
Background:	Researching	‘offender	narratives’	in	the	justice	system	
Despite	community	and	institutional	consternation	about	offender	rehabilitation,	there	remains	
a	 paucity	 of	 research	 concerning	 offenders’	 actual	 experiences	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	
This	article	contributes	to	that	slowly	growing	body	of	socio‐legal	and	criminology	scholarship	
concerned	with	examining	the	daily	practices,	and	experiences	of	people	who	work	in,	and	who	
find	 themselves	 caught	 up	 in,	 the	 justice	 system	 (see	 Crewe	 2009,	 2013;	Hall	 2014;	 Schinkel	
2014).	 The	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘lived	 sentence’	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	 a	 narrow,	 legalistic	 view	 of	
sentencing	 highlights	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 sentenced	 person	 and	 focuses	 on	 the	 continuous	
nature	of	the	expectations	derived	from	the	sentence	(Hall	2014).		
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Our	 work	 builds	 on	 that	 empirical	 research	 involving	 ‘offender	 narratives’:	 for	 instance,	 the	
ways	 in	 which	 legal	 narratives	 about	 people	 get	 constructed	 and	 deployed.	 Drawing	 on	
ethnographic	observation	of	police	practices,	McConville,	Sanders	and	Leng	(1991)	have	shown	
how	police	construct	 the	 legal	narrative	through	 the	process	of	 investigation.	They	argue	 that	
police	 facts	 are	 versions	 of	 events	 constructed	 to	 present	 the	 narrative	most	 favourable	 to	 a	
finding	of	guilt,	and	the	majority	of	defendants	plead	guilty	on	the	basis	of	these	 ‘agreed	facts’	
(McConville,	Sanders	and	Leng	1991:	65).	The	complex	negotiations	between	prosecution	and	
defence	counsel	in	order	to	attain	a	plea	are	an	important	but	largely	uninterrogated	part	of	the	
construction	of	narrative.	Significant	 incentives	exist	 to	plead	guilty	and	 the	 fact	 that	 the	vast	
majority	of	matters	proceed	by	way	of	a	plea	of	guilty	highlights	the	significance	of	 the	police	
facts,	or	the	version	ultimately	accepted	by	the	court	(Flynn	2012).		
	
While	 it	 is	 often	 assumed	 ‘that	 these	 primary	 facts	 exist,	 [instead]	 they	 are	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	
process	of	construction	…	Facts	are	not	elicited,	they	are	created’	(McConville,	Sanders	and	Leng	
1991:	 65‐66).	 The	 typology	 of	 interrogative	 questions	 demonstrates	 how	 the	 expert	
investigator,	 creating	 a	 case	 against	 the	 defendant,	 does	 not	 allow	 the	 development	 of	 the	
suspect’s	 narrative,	 but	 produces	 answers	 compatible	 with	 the	 need	 for	 the	 elements	 of	 the	
offence	 to	 be	 satisfied:	 ‘these	 [types	 of	 questions]	 have	 one	 other	 crucial	 property:	 they	 are	
almost	 never	 followed	 by	 “neutral”	 questioning	 designed	 to	 elicit	 the	 suspect’s	 own	 story’.	
Indeed,	McConville,	 Sanders	 and	 Leng	 (1991:	 71)	 assert,	 the	whole	 interview	 is	 designed	 ‘to	
suppress	 any	 attempt	 to	 introduce	 exculpatory	 material	 into	 the	 interview’.	 Kate	 Haworth	
(2009)	has	developed	these	insights	to	argue	that	the	police	interview	constitutes	an	interaction	
where	 only	 one	 side	 is	 truly	 prepared	 for	 the	 ‘multi‐audience’	 nature	 of	 the	 contact.	
Unbeknownst	 to	 the	 defendant	 in	 the	 police	 station,	 the	 official,	 legal	 narrative	 being	
constructed	there	and	then	will	be	later	subjected	to	the	multiple	audiences	of	court,	prison	and	
parole	 authorities	 and,	 in	 many	 cases,	 wider	 public	 opinion.7	 We	 build	 on	 these	 studies,	
examining	how,	throughout	justice	system	processes,	including	decades	in	prison,	offenders	are	
required	to	offer	up	very	particular	accounts	of	themselves.		
	
Over	 the	past	several	decades,	a	 significant	body	of	work	has	emerged,	particularly	 in	 the	US,	
but	 also	 in	 civil	 law	 countries,	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 narrative	 in	 the	 reception	 of	 evidence	
during	the	trial	process	(see	Brooks	and	Gewirtz	1996).	As	has	been	acknowledged	in	relation	
to	the	way	trial	judges	receive	evidence	in	the	Netherlands,	‘a	good	story	is	worth	half	the	proof’	
(Wagenaar,	 van	 Koppen	 and	 Crombag	 1992:	 44).	 Such	 work	 has	 traditionally	 focused	 on	
narrative	 strategies	 employed	 by	 lawyers	 to	 prove	 crimes	 or	 defend	 defendants.	 Far	 less	
examined,	however,	are	the	stories	expected	from	offenders	during	sentencing	matters,	parole	
hearings	and	incarceration.	Our	work	builds	on	very	recent	criminological	research	concerning	
offender	narratives	in	court	and	in	prison.	For	example,	Diana	Eades	(2008),	in	a	sociolinguistic	
examination	of	courtroom	language,	has	shown	that	cultural	assumptions	about	how	language	
works	can	affect	the	way	Indigenous	defendants	understand	what	is	going	on,	and	how	they	are	
understood	 by	 fact‐finders	 and	 arbiters	 of	 law.	 She	 has	 also	 shown	 how	 the	 process	 of	
segmenting	or	 fragmenting	the	narrative	by	questioning	begins	 in	the	police	 interview	(Eades	
2008:	 210).	 Weisman	 (2004,	 2009),	 Hall	 (2014)	 and	 Rossmanith	 (2015)	 have	 similarly	
illustrated	how	sentencing	and	other	criminal	justice	processes	contain	implicit	expectations	of	
offenders	 to	 act	 and	 speak	 in	 certain	 ways	 (including,	 for	 instance,	 the	 construction	 of	 an	
acceptable	remorse	narrative).		
	
In	 this	 article,	we	not	 only	 acknowledge	 that	 courts	 and	prisons	 implicitly	 expect	 a	 degree	of	
narrative	 competence	on	 the	part	of	defendants	 and	offenders;	we	also	 go	 a	 step	 further	 and	
show	that	offenders	are	expected	to	perform	a	very	particular,	constrained	self‐narrative	with	
which	they	do	not	personally	identify.	In	prison,	the	official	narrative	follows	the	prisoner	and	is	
embellished	by	program	and	custodial	staff.	We	build	on	the	important	work	of	Maruna	(2001),	
McKendy	 (2006),	 Waldram	 (2007,	 2012),	 Ugelvik	 (2014)	 and	 Schinkel	 (2014)	 –	 studies	
concerning	the	types	of	narratives	expected	of	offenders	in	prison	and	in	cognitive	behavioural	
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programs	 –	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	way	 that	 prisoners	 are	 further	 distanced	 from	 attaching	
themselves	to	a	self‐narrative	that	they	 feel	more	closely	 ‘belongs’	 to	 them.	Our	work	extends	
these	 insights	 to	 maintain	 that	 these	 constrained	 narratives	 actually	 work	 against	 offender	
rehabilitation	by	denying	opportunities	for	authentic	self‐reflection.	
	
Our	article	also	contributes	to	research	concerning	judicial	decision‐making.	For	more	than	two	
decades,	it	has	been	increasingly	acknowledged	that	judicial	decision‐making	can	no	longer	be	
properly	 constructed	 in	 terms	of	a	 ‘rational’	 and	 ‘emotional’	binary,	 as	 if	 those	were	separate	
domains	 (see	 Bandes	 and	 Blumenthal	 2012).	 In	 particular,	 our	 work	 builds	 on	 the	 growing	
scholarship	 concerned	 with	 examining	 the	 range	 of	 factors	 influencing	 judges’	 judgments,	
including	 the	 affective	 dimension	 of	 human	 exchanges	 (see	 Bandes	 2009;	 Rossmanith	 2015),	
and	the	ways	in	which	narratives	affect	reasoning	at	a	neurological	level	(Barraza	and	Romero	
2014).	In	so	doing,	we	show	how	offender	self‐narratives	are	critical	 factors	when	it	comes	to	
authorities	making	decisions	about	those	offenders.	
	
Over	the	last	decade,	scholars	have	identified	what	they	see	as	a	move	away	from	the	narrative	
form	in	criminal	sentencing	to	a	more	technocratic,	impersonal	way	of	dealing	with	information.	
Jacqueline	 Tombs	 (2008)	 has	 expressed	 concerns	 that	 judges	 are	 moving	 away	 from	
‘imaginative’	 sentencing	 to	 ‘imaginary’	 sentencing	 (see	 also	 Rossmanith	 2013);	 and	 Katja	
Franko	 Aas	 (2005)	 has	 critically	 analysed	 the	 rise	 of	 technocratic	 instruments	 in	 sentencing	
practices.	 We	 do	 not	 see	 any	 contradiction	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 these	 factors	 and	 our	
contention	 that	 expectations	 to	 provide	 acceptable	 narrative	 form	 another	 type	 of	 discursive	
constraint	 on	 the	 prisoner/offender.	 That	 the	 increasing	 reliance	 on	 risk‐based	 thinking	
constrains	the	acceptable	narratives	available	to	offenders	only	supports	our	argument	that	the	
offender	is	unable	to	present	an	alternative	narrative	that	will	be	consonant	with	the	demands	
of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Technocratic	 justice	 requires	 stories	 that	 can	 be	 easily	
categorised,	sorted	and	stored.	
	
All	 the	scholarship	cited	above	has	adopted	various	methodologies	 in	order	 to	 investigate	 the	
relevant	 objects	 of	 study.	 Among	 these,	 ethnographic	 approaches	 are	 emerging	 as	 especially	
rich	ways	 to	reveal	otherwise	hidden	dimensions	of	people’s	practices	and	experiences	 in	 the	
justice	 system.	 Spending	 extended	 time	 with	 people	 –	 through,	 for	 example,	 participant	
observation	and	lengthy	interviews	–	allows	for	unique	insights	into	those	people’s	daily	lives.	It	
accesses	aspects	of	those	people’s	lives	and	working	practices	that	are	most	meaningful	to	them.	
Both	authors	of	 this	 article	 carried	out	 significant	 ethnographic	 fieldwork:	 in	2010	and	2011,	
Hall	 conducted	 30	 lengthy	 interviews	with	male	 prisoners	 serving	more	 than	 three	 years	 in	
seven	 medium	 and	 maximum	 security	 prisons	 in	 NSW;	 between	 2010‐2013,	 Rossmanith	
conducted	 50	 formal	 interviews,	 and	 many	 dozen	 informal	 ones,	 with	 Supreme	 Court	 and	
District	Court	judges,	with	Local	Court	magistrates,	and	with	lawyers,	forensic	psychologists	and	
psychiatrists,	court	chaplains,	members	of	the	parole	board,	caseworkers,	victims	and	offenders.	
Rossmanith	also	attended	more	than	100	court	and	parole	hearings	and	private	meetings	of	the	
NSW	State	Parole	Authority.	Together,	we	have	 identified	 the	 curious	ways	 in	which	offender	
narratives	‘work’	through	court	processes	and	prison.	It	is	to	these	narratives	that	we	now	turn.	
	
From	police	interrogation	to	the	courtroom:	Imposed	stories	during	in‐court	processes		
Beginning	with	the	police	 investigation,	 the	construction	of	 the	 legal	story,	which	will	 initially	
provide	the	case	against	the	defendant,	 is	solely	 in	the	hands	of	police	and	often	occurs	in	the	
context	 of	 police	 interrogation	 (Haworth	 2009;	 McConville,	 Sanders	 and	 Leng	 1991).	 Peter	
Brooks,	in	his	scholarship	on	confession,	similarly	identifies	the	way	that	the	police	narrative	is	
constructed,	drawing	on	the	critical	writings	of	US	Chief	Justice	Warren	(who	offers	an	analysis	
of	police	interrogation	manuals):	 ‘The	idea	[behind	the	“chilling”	tactics	in	such	manuals],	says	
Warren,	is	to	compel	the	suspect	to	confirm	the	“preconceived	story	the	police	seek	to	have	him	
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describe”	[Miranda	v	Arizona	1966	the	Supreme	Court,	at	455].	At	 this	point,	one	must	ask	of	
the	confession	made:	Whose	story	is	it?’	(Brooks	1996:	117).	
	
Developing	the	argument	from	these	studies,	we	suggest	that,	as	a	summary	of	the	police	case	at	
its	highest,	this	legal	narrative	becomes	the	account	of	the	offence	to	which	the	individual	must	
subscribe.	The	reliance	from	this	day	forward	on	the	official	record	as	‘truth’	does	not	allow	for	
offenders	to	have	their	own	version	of	events	at	all.	If	the	facts	are	relied	upon,	as	they	are	in	the	
vast	majority	of	criminal	cases,	the	privileged	legal	narrative	becomes	reified.8		
		
If,	at	 the	time	of	 the	police	 investigation,	the	official	 legal	narrative	 is	constructed,	 it	 is	during	
court	 processes	 that	 this	 story	 is	 sutured	 to	 the	 offender.	 It	 is	 at	 this	 stage	 when	 the	 story,	
moulded	 though	 it	 will	 be	 by	 in‐court	 processes,	 is	 forcibly	 accepted	 and	 performed	 by	 that	
offender.9	 These	 processes	 involve	 pressure	 for	 offenders	 to	 offer	 up	 a	 confined	 narrative	 of	
themselves.	For	example,	increasingly	in	the	NSW	criminal	courts	there	is	a	veiled	expectation	
for,	 and	 pressure	 on,	 offenders	 to	 give	 sworn	 evidence	 at	 sentence	 that	 indicate	 remorse.	 As	
Rossmanith	(2015)	points	out,	recent	 legislative	changes	to	the	Crimes	(Sentencing	Procedure)	
Act	1999	No.	92	(NSW)	concerning	evidence	of	remorse,	have	raised	questions	about	whether	or	
not	 offenders	who	make	 claims	 of	 remorse	 are	 required	 to	 give	 sworn	 evidence.	 Rossmanith	
shows	how	the	NSW	Court	of	Criminal	Appeal	concluded:		
	
…	 first,	 that	 ‘there	 is	 no	 statutory	 requirement	 that	 an	 offender	 give	 evidence	
before	 remorse	 can	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	 sentence’;	 and	
second,	 ‘in	assessing	the	weight	of	evidence	of	remorse	[the	 judge	was]	entitled	
to	take	into	account	the	fact	that	the	[offender]	did	not	give	evidence’.10	In	other	
words,	 in	 order	 to	 argue	 you	 are	 remorseful,	 you	 don’t	 have	 to	 get	 into	 the	
witness	box	 and	 speak	of	 your	 remorse,	but	 you	 are	probably	disadvantaged	 if	
you	don’t	(Rossmanith	2015:	169).	
	
In	 giving	 this	 sworn	evidence,	 offenders	must	 accept	 the	official	 legal	 narrative	 –	 the	 agreed‐
upon	facts	–	and	try	to	make	it	their	own	through	(enacted)	self‐narration.	For	example,	when	
asked	 if	 he	 had	 encountered	 remorseful	 offenders	 in	 court,	 one	 NSW	 District	 Court	 judge	
explained:		
	
Oh	yes.	Absolutely.	…	If	the	causes	of	their	offending	are	identified,	that	is	often	a	
good	sign	of	remorse.	You	know,	if	they	actually	face	up	to	the	underlying	causes	
of	 their	 offending.	 [For	 example,	 if]	 somebody	 who	 embezzles	 three	 or	 four‐
hundred	thousand	dollars	from	their	employer	says:	‘My	life	was	falling	apart.	My	
wife	had	left	me.	My	business	fell	apart.	But	I	wanted	to	keep	the	lifestyle	that	I	
was	living.	I	wanted	to	put	on	this	pretence,	so	I	started	embezzling	money	from	
my	 clients’.	 That’s	 genuine	 remorse,	 because	 they’re	 saying	 ‘My	motivation	 for	
committing	the	offence	was	totally	immoral.	That	is,	I	wanted	to	pretend	to	[my]	
work	that	I	was	still	this	affluent’	–	and	they	actually	come	out	and	tell	you	that,	
and	you	know	that	that’s	genuine	remorse.	
	
A	NSW	Supreme	Court	judge,	when	asked	the	same	question,	pretended	to	be	a	male	offender	in	
the	witness	box.	She	said:		
	
Look,	to	be	honest	with	you,	up	until	six	weeks	ago	I	hadn’t	really	thought	about	
what	I’d	done.	Then	I	suddenly	thought	‘Wow!	What	if	someone	had	hit	my	sister?	
What	 if	 it	was	my	mother	who	was	 robbed	and	knocked	over	and	her	handbag	
was	snatched?	And	I	thought	to	myself:	What	have	I	done?’.	
	
These	judges	are	offering	the	types	of	offender	self‐narratives	required	and	how	such	narratives	
should	be	performed.	 It	 has	been	acknowledged	 that	 courts	 and	 restorative	 justice	processes	
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implicitly	 expect	 a	 degree	 of	 narrative	 competence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 defendants	 and	 offenders	
(Bartels	 and	 Richards	 2013;	 Eades	 2008;	 Martin,	 Zappavigna	 and	 Dwyer	 2007;	 Rossmanith	
2014).	We	argue,	however,	that	in	sentencing	matters,	it	is	not	simply	any	sort	of	self‐narration	
that	 is	required	 from	offenders	 in	court.	 It	 is	not	simply	that	offenders	require	competence	in	
telling	their	own	stories;	rather	they	are	expected	to	perform	a	very	particular,	constrained	self‐
narrative	that	most	likely	does	not	feel	to	them	like	‘theirs’	at	all.	
	
To	an	extent,	these	judges	are	offering	what	Richard	Weisman	would	recognise	as	a	remorseful	
acknowledgment	 of	 the	 offence	 (2009:	 52).11	 Weisman	 points	 out	 that,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
enacting	remorse,	an	offender’s	admission	of	responsibility	(‘acknowledgment’)	for	the	offence	
is	 far	more	complex	than	merely	a	plea	of	guilty;	 there	 is	 ‘the	expectation	 that	 the	remorseful	
offender	 acknowledge	 their	 agency	 in	 perpetrating	 the	 offense’	 (2009:	 52).	 We	 suggest,	
however,	 that	 this	acknowledgment	by	the	offender	of	his	 transgression	 involves	the	offender	
having	to	take	on,	and	own,	in	court,	the	facts	as	they	were	constructed	at	the	time	of	the	police	
investigation,	and	further	subjected	to	the	unofficial	negotiation	which	goes	on	between	defence	
counsel	and	prosecution.	In	other	words,	while	overtly	the	remorse	discourse	in	court	is	one	of	
internality	 –	 ‘on	 the	 inner	 life	 of	 the	 transgressor’	 (Weisman	 2009:	 48)	 –	 we	 suggest	 that	
offender	 stories	 are	 imposed	 on	 offenders	 from	 the	 outside.	 Such	 self‐narratives	 are	 not	
products	of	 soul‐searching	but	 rather	an	awkward	suturing	 together	of	official	 legal	narrative	
and	an	offender	whose	capacity	to	perform	such	a	narrative	is	seriously	compromised.		
	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 remorse	 assessment	 and	 to	 sentencing	matters	more	 generally,	 the	 court’s	
preoccupation	 with	 the	 inner	 life	 of	 the	 offender	 results	 in	 further	 psychosocial	 narratives	
becoming	part	of	the	prisoner’s	story.	For	example,	a	NSW	senior	crown	prosecutor	and	former	
defence	 counsel	 explained	 how	he	would	 encourage	 a	 remorse	 narrative‐enactment	 from	his	
client:		
	
If	 I	was	 defence	 counsel,	what	 I’d	 be	 inclined	 to	 do	 is	 to	 say	 [to	 the	 offender],	
‘Look,	you’re	going	 to	have	 to	explain	 to	 the	 judge	why	you	did	 it	and	how	you	
feel	about	it	now,	and	you’ll	have	to	show	some	understanding	of	the	impact	that	
it’s	had	on	the	victim,	how	you	feel	about	the	victim	now,	and	how	you	see	your	
future,	what	you’d	like	to	do	in	your	future.	And	how	you	think	you’ve	developed	
in	 the	meantime’.	 Things	 like	 that.	 I’d	 give	 them	 topics;	 a	 list	 that	 they	 can	 go	
away	and	think	about.	
	
This	legal	counsel	is	introducing	the	offender	to	the	aims	of	sentencing,12	and	to	what	Weisman	
(2009:	 64)	 has	 identified	 as	 a	 narrative	 of	 acknowledgment,	 suffering	 and	 personal	
transformation	that	is	expected	from	the	courts.	And	yet	to	what	extent	does	such	a	narrative	
emerge	from	within	the	offender	through	a	process	of	so‐called	internal	reflection	(even	a	form	
of	coerced	reflection),	and	to	what	extent	is	it	an	external	cobbling‐together?	We	suggest	it	is	the	
latter.		
	
In	 court,	 the	 judiciary,	 without	 even	 necessarily	 realising	 it	 themselves,	 expect	 a	 particular	
narrative	 performance	 from	 offenders:	 a	 ‘remorse	 habitus’	 (Rossmanith	 2014:	 21‐22)	 that	
involves	 a	 whole‐hearted	 acceptance	 of,	 and	 performance	 of,	 the	 official	 legally	 agreed‐upon	
facts,	 together	with	 a	 personal	 story.	 A	 NSW	magistrate	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 say	 that,	 when	 an	
offender	gets	into	the	witness	box	and	tells	his	story	(that	is,	when	an	offender	gives	evidence	of	
his	remorse),	he	ceases	to	be	‘other’	and	instead	becomes	‘like	us’.	The	offender’s	self‐narrative	
allows	 the	 magistrate	 to	 identify	 with	 that	 offender.	 Drawing	 on	 her	 interviews	 with	 the	
judiciary,	 Rossmanith	 has	 written	 of	 so‐called	 ‘successful’	 remorse	 narrative‐enactments	 of	
offenders,	 and	 the	profoundly	affective	dimension	of	 them.	She	argues	 that,	when	 it	 comes	 to	
offenders	getting	into	the	witness	box	and	‘giving	voice’	to	their	remorse,	‘something	often	gets	
felt	 by	 the	 judges	 at	 the	 level	 of	 embodied	 affect	 that	 then	 enables	 judges	 to	 declare:	 “This	
person	is	remorseful”’	(Rossmanith	2015:	171).	
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In	 other	 words,	 people’s	 stories	 –	 the	 self‐narration	 they	 enact	 –	 are	 co‐constituted.	 Eades	
writes	that	 ‘it	 is	problematic	 to	view	the	stories	which	emerge	 in	 these	 [legal	and	courtroom]	
contexts	 as	 the	 sole	 product	 of	 the	 storyteller’	 (2008:	 214;	 see	 also	 Baldwin	 and	McConville	
1977;	 McConville,	 Sander	 and	 Leng	 1991;	 Rossmanith	 2014).	 And	 yet,	 as	 was	 illustrated	 in	
example	one	at	the	start	of	this	article	about	the	young	man’s	parole	hearing,	many	(if	not	most)	
offenders	simply	cannot	execute	the	cognitive	gymnastics	required	to	accept	the	legal	narrative	
that	has	been	imposed	on	them	and,	in	turn,	to	successfully	perform	it	back	to	the	courts.		
	
There	are,	of	course,	exceptions.	The	account	at	the	start	of	this	article	about	the	inmate’s	parole	
hearing	 (‘I’m	 sorry	 for	 what	 I	 done?’)	 can	 be	 juxtaposed	 with	 the	 following	 account.	 In	 the	
1980s,	David	appealed	a	sentence	for	heroin	possession	and	supply.13	He	wrote	a	letter	to	the	
court.	There	was	a	10‐minute	silence	while	the	judge	read	it.		
	
‘Looking	back	 I	 think	 it	was	a	bit	 of	 psychobabble,’	David	explained	 to	Rossmanith	during	 an	
interview:	
	
But	 the	 line	 I	 ran	 [in	 the	 letter]	was:	 ‘Looking	 at	 all	 this	 now,	 I’ve	 always	 been	
emotionally	 independent.	 When	 I	 started	 using	 drugs	 I	 thought	 it	 was	 just	 a	
choice,	 a	 hedonistic	 thing	 and	 a	 matter	 of	 my	 own	 sovereignty.	 But	 now,	 in	
response	to	it	being	put	to	me	by	people	in	the	therapeutic	community,	I	realise	
that	cannot	be	right	because	normal	people	don’t	end	up	with	smack	habits	and	
nearly	 dead’.	 I	 wrote	 that	 maybe	 something	 else	 was	 wrong	 with	 me	 that	 I’d	
never	acknowledged.	‘My	mother	died	when	I	was	young	and	I	closed	off	for	a	bit.	
I	was	the	kind	of	kid	who	was	the	least	problem.	But	then	my	marriage	broke	up	
and	I	found	myself	using’.	I	wrote	that	I	didn’t	want	to	be	in	that	state	anymore,	
that	 I’ve	 been	 drug	 and	 alcohol‐free	 for	 eight	 weeks,	 that	 I’m	 going	 to	 NA	
meetings	and	that	I’m	taking	one	day	at	a	time.	As	the	judge	read	it,	I	knew	he	was	
impressed.	 I	 knew	 the	 letter	would	 play	well.	 But	 it	 also	 happened	 to	 be	 true.	
When	the	judge	read	it,	he	looked	at	me	–	really	looked	at	me	–	for	the	first	time.	I	
thought	 ‘Gotcha’.	 I	 even	 got	 the	 prosecutor.	 I	 could	 see	 a	 softening	 in	 him	
somehow.	
	
While	David’s	story	is	not	‘imposed’	on	him	in	the	same	sense	as	the	young	man	in	example	two	
in	our	introduction,	David	recognises	that	the	narrative	he	tells	is	an	acceptable	one.	He	knows	
that	 it	makes	 sense	 to	 the	 judge	and	 fits	with	 the	 range	of	 redemptive	narratives	available	 to	
offenders.	While	David’s	constructed	self‐narrative	and	the	official	legal	one	are	congruent,	his	
case	shows	how	the	offender’s	acceptance	of	a	self‐narrative	which	fits	the	ideal	‘connects’	with	
the	judge	and	even	with	the	prosecutor.	Calling	it	 ‘the	line	I	ran’	contributes	to	the	impression	
that,	 although	 not	 totally	 ‘inauthentic’,	 David’s	 self‐narrative	 has	 been	 carefully	 crafted	 and	
honed	for	the	purpose	of	getting	the	judge	to	identify	with	him	as	a	person.	
	
Constructed	self‐narratives	in	prison	
During	 modern	 trial	 and	 sentencing	 procedures,	 the	 prisoner	 is	 often	 silent,	 speaking	 only	
through	his	legal	representative,	rarely	exposing	himself	by	giving	evidence	in	the	witness	box,	
with	the	significant	exception	being	that	of	the	enactment	of	remorse.	As	soon	as	they	enter	the	
prison	 and	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 therapeutic	 gaze	 of	 prison	 rehabilitation,	 prisoners	 must	
immediately	 accept	 and	 enact	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	 definition	 of	 themselves	
contained	 in	 the	 psychosocial	 narratives	 of	 the	 sentence.	 This	 involves	 a	 complex	 range	 of	
internal	 and	 external	 processes	 for	 the	 prisoner	 who	 is	 already	 adapting	 to	 the	 vagaries	 of	
prison	 life.	He	must	 accept	and	endure	 the	denunciatory	and	punitive	 effects	of	 the	 sentence,	
and	 simultaneously	 accept	 the	 official	 version	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 perform	 the	 version	 of	
rehabilitation	most	suited	to	this	account	
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When	a	person	is	committed	to	prison,	the	accompanying	court	documentation	ends	up	in	the	
hands	of	prison	authorities.	This	material	can	be	limited	to	a	summary	of	the	judge’s	comments	
on	sentence.	One	prisoner	in	Hall’s	study	said	that	the	prison	had	only	a	small	extract	of	what	
were	his	judge’s	lengthy	sentence	comments	(Hall	2014).	The	authorities	use	such	documents	to	
inform	their	dealings	with	prisoners:	risk	assessment	instruments	are	administered;	case‐plans	
are	 developed.	 Most	 importantly,	 the	 facts	 about	 the	 offence	 (via	 the	 ‘fact	 sheet’	 or	 the	
comments	 made	 on	 sentence)	 are	 treated	 as	 ‘the	 truth’	 (Hall	 2014).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	
‘imposed	narrative’	that	has	been	sutured	to	the	offender	during	in‐court	processes	travels	with	
that	offender	into	prison.		
	
Prisoners	often	do	not	accept	the	official	legal	narrative	to	begin	with,	and	yet	they	are	trapped	
into	 re‐telling	 it.	 From	 the	 very	 beginning,	 they	 have	 the	 dilemma	 of	 ‘narrative	 authenticity’	
(Frank	2010:	11);	according	to	them,	‘their’	story	isn’t,	and	was	never,	theirs.	Moreover,	there	is	
little	 opportunity	 for	 ‘narrative	 ambush’,14	 as	 the	 circumstances	 in	 prison	 do	 not	 afford	
prisoners	the	opportunity	to	develop	a	self‐narrative	that	they	feel	more	accurately	represents	
who	 they	 feel	 they	 are,	what	 they’ve	 done,	 and	why	 they’ve	 done	 it.	 At	 stake,	 of	 course,	 is	 a	
prisoner’s	parole	date.15	
	
In	 her	 interviews	with	 prisoners,	 sociolinguist	 Patricia	 O’Connor	was	 particularly	 affected	 by	
one	man’s	plea	to	her	to	come	back	to	the	prison	and	speak	with	him	because	‘there	are	no	new	
conversations	here’	(2001:	1).	This	exemplifies	the	limits	on	the	opportunities	for	the	kinds	of	
conversations	conducive	 to	the	 formation	of	new	offender	narratives.	As	McKendy	points	out:	
‘Even	 as	 demands	 are	 placed	 on	 them	 to	 take	 on	 the	 project	 of	making	 themselves	 over	 into	
rational,	self‐possessed	responsible	agents,	opportunities	to	actually	do	that	are	sorely	lacking’	
(McKendy	2006:	496).	Offenders	who	are	 in	solitary	confinement,	 for	 instance,	are	denied	the	
intersubjectivity	critical	to	the	development	of	self‐narratives.	Hall	 found	this	in	her	interview	
with	‘Chris’	who	had	spent	four	years	in	a	‘supermax’	prison:	
	
Chris:	Um,	the	isolation	…	is	exhausting.	
Interviewer:	 That’s	 an	 interesting	 way	 to	 describe	 it	 ...	 ‘exhausting’.	 Because	
you’re	with	yourself	all	the	time?	
Chris:	You	don’t	know	what’s	going	on	around	you	so	you’re	constantly	battling	
with	 yourself	 trying	 to	 describe	what	 it	might	 be	 or	might	 not	 be	…	 but	 it’s	…	
exhausting,	because	I	don’t	care	how	tough	you	are,	or	how	you	want	to	portray	
yourself	being	a	hard	person,	you	still	need	that	contact	verbally	or	whatever	…	
When	 you	 don’t	 know	what’s	 going	 on	 around	 you	 and	 you’ve	 got	 no	 control,	
even	more	 so,	 it	 is	 exhausting	 ’cause	 it’s	 a	 constant	 battle	 to	 try	 and	 reassure	
yourself.		
	
Chris’s	 description	 of	 his	 experience	 of	 the	 High	 Risk	 Management	 Unit	 in	 the	 Goulburn	
Correctional	Centre	(or	‘supermax'	prison),	which	involved	long	periods	of	solitary	confinement,	
highlighted	his	 inability	to	provide	an	acceptable	explanation	to	himself	of	what	was	going	on	
around	him.	This	speaks	to	the	profoundly	interpersonal	aspect	of	narrative	construction.		
	
The	 prison	 system	 is	 a	 site	 that	 not	 only	 enforces	 physical	 control	 on	 the	 prisoner	 but	 also	
imposes	‘discursive	confinement’	(McKendy	2006:	496).	Chris	spoke	of	the	lack	of	talk,	but	even	
talking	 itself	 has	 consequences	 in	prison	 (for	 example,	 unstructured	 interactions	on	 the	wing	
can	be	 reported	and	discussed	by	staff).	The	discursive	confinement	of	 the	prison	 is	arguably	
deepened	by	the	role	of	prison	officers	as	‘case	managers’:	pseudo‐psychosocial	assessments	by	
untrained	prison	officers	are	viewed	with	much	hostility	and	suspicion	by	prisoners	but	often	
accepted	as	evidence	by	prison	and	parole	authorities	(Hall	2014).	For	example,	 in	 interviews	
with	Hall,	one	prisoner	whispered,	‘I	can	slip	my	guard	with	you	because	you’re	not	part	of	the	
system’;	another	prisoner	said,	‘I	watch	everything	I	do’.	Assessed	and	evaluated	constantly,	and	
aware	of	 ‘the	power	of	the	pen’	(Crewe	2009;	Hall	2014),	prisoners	are	often	careful	of	saying	
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anything	 which	 could	 compromise	 their	 situation.	 Moreover,	 the	 prison	 experience,	 together	
with	 the	quality	 of	 prisoners’	 lives	before	 prison,	makes	 it	 difficult	 for	 them	 to	 speak	directly	
about	their	situation.		
	
Particular	 offender	 narratives	 are	 considered	 so	 important,	 so	 central	 to	 the	 offender’s	
rehabilitation	 (and	 by	 extension	 to	 his	 parole	 release),	 that	 prisoners	 who	 refuse	 to	 give	 an	
acceptable	 narrative	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 crimes	 are	 viewed	 with	 much	 suspicion.	 Weisman	
(2004)	has	written	of	the	sorts	of	remorse	expectations	placed	on	offenders	and	how,	in	cases	of	
wrongful	 conviction,	prisoners	who	maintain	 their	 innocence	are	 severely	disadvantaged.	But	
even	those	prisoners	who	have	pleaded	guilty	are	still	expected	to	offer	particular,	constrained	
self‐narratives,	 and	 are	 further	 punished	 for	 not	 so	 doing.	 For	 instance,	 ‘Mario’,	 serving	 a	
sentence	 for	 attempted	 murder,	 refused	 to	 give	 an	 account	 of	 the	 offence.	 In	 his	 view,	 he	
pleaded	guilty	and	he	did	not	see	why	he	should	divulge	any	further	information	about	himself.	
His	oppositional	attitude	had	not	endeared	him	to	prison	authorities	and,	despite	the	absence	of	
violent	or	criminal	behaviour	in	custody,	his	classification	was	still	high	considering	the	length	
of	time	he	had	served.	The	absence	of	a	convincing	narrative	of	himself	and	of	his	offence	placed	
him	in	a	‘high	risk’	category.16	
	
Offenders	need	to	be	able	to	tell	a	positive	story	about	themselves	in	order	to	build	a	narrative	
that	 assists	 desistance	 from	 crime.	 This	 often	 conflicts	 with	 the	 expectation	 that	 they	 enact	
remorse	in	a	self‐denunciatory	manner.	As	Maruna	(2001)	and	Ugelvik	(2012)	have	pointed	out,	
prisoners’	denial	and	disagreement	with	the	official	narrative	may	indeed	be	an	essential	part	of	
the	formation	of	the	redemptive	narrative	most	consistent	with	desistance.		
	
The	official	narrative	is	thus	separate	from,	but	comes	to	have	power	over,	the	prisoner,	as	he	is	
required	to	self‐narrate	according	to	the	rules.	In	cognitive	behavioural	programs,	prisoners	are	
given	 a	 format	 and	 are	 forced	 to	 produce	 an	 ‘autobiography’,	 which	must	 match	 the	 official	
record	held	by	staff.	Held	to	an	account	that	is	seen	to	embody	‘truth’,	any	deviation	will	be	seen	
as	a	 failure	 to	accept	responsibility.	Subjective	meaning	and	affect	are	excised	 from	their	past	
life	leaving	a	collection	of	dates	and	events	(see	Waldram	2007).	The	way	that	the	life	story	of	
the	 offender	 is	moulded	 and	 finessed	 to	 fit	 the	 habitus	 of	 the	 therapeutic	 program	 by	 other	
prisoners	and	staff	produces	an	account	which	the	offender	must	be	seen	to	 identify	with	and	
own,	as	much	as	it	may	be	an	uncomfortable	fit	with	their	sense	of	reality.		
	
Take	for	example,	 ‘Matty’.	Of	the	five	years	Matty	spent	in	prison,	the	final	two	were	at	a	drug	
treatment	centre	 in	a	NSW	jail.	He	undertook	an	 intense	rehabilitation	program	during	which	
‘honesty	and	consequences	were	drilled	into	you,’	Matty	told	Rossmanith.	The	whole	program	
‘felt	 stupid	 at	 the	 time’,	 but	 in	 hindsight	 it	 changed	 his	 life.	 He	 had	 to	 write	 his	 own	
autobiography	 ‘from	my	 earliest	 childhood	memory,	 through	 school,	 through	 all	my	 criminal	
behaviour,	 explaining	how	 I	 got	where	 I	 am,’	 he	 says.	 The	psychologists	were	 looking	 for	 his	
‘core	belief’,	why	he	thought	it	had	all	gone	wrong.		
	
Matty	explains:		
	
There	were	 twelve	guys	 in	our	group,	 and	 ten	of	 them	came	up	with	 ‘unloved’.	
[The	psychologists	were]	trying	to	say	that	there’s	a	reason	why	things	went	the	
way	they	did.	 I	 tried	 to	 tell	everyone	that	 I	went	 the	way	 I	did	because,	when	I	
was	 young,	 I	 saw	 [that]	my	 friends	had	 everything	because	 they	were	 stealing,	
and	I	had	nothing.	I	saw	how	easy	they	were	getting	it	and	I	just	wanted	it.	There	
was	no	 reason	behind	 it.	 [The	psychologists]	were	 trying	 to	 tell	me	 that	 it	was	
because	I	didn’t	have	a	father	figure	and	that	I	was	unloved	–	so	I	said	to	them,	
‘Okay,	 I	 was	 unloved’.	 But	 I	 get	 on	 good	 with	 my	 family.	 [My	 offending	 had]	
nothing	to	do	with	love.	It’s	just	that	we	were	poor	and	we	had	nothing.	
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The	fact	that	cognitive	behavioural	therapy17	is	a	perfect	fit	for	the	managerialist,	risk	obsessed	
modern	 correctional	 system	 has	 been	 commented	 on	 elsewhere	 (Hall	 2014;	 McKendy	 2006;	
Waldram	2007).	That	it	works	to	further	the	ideological	apparatus	of	 individual	responsibility	
makes	it	a	natural	fit	with	the	modern	version	of	rehabilitation.	We	suggest	that	the	ease	with	
which	the	correctional	therapeutic	milieu	produces	imposed,	manufactured	stories	lends	itself	
to	 the	 effacement	 of	 the	 socioeconomic	 reality	 of	many	 prisoners	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 privileged	
psycho‐narrative	of	personal	responsibility.	
	
The	 lack	 of	 control	 prisoners	 feel	 over	 stories	 of	 their	 lives	 is	 expressed	 by	 a	 prisoner	 who	
pointed	out	 that	 the	program	staff	 in	 the	prison	used	 the	 official	narrative	 to	 ‘catch	him	out’.	
John	said	to	Hall:	
	
But	what	I	can’t	understand	is	[that]	when	I	go	to	CUBIT18	to	do	my	course	they	
say,	 ‘Oh	we’ve	 just	been	reading	through	your	 judge’s	remarks’.	See,	they’ve	got	
access	to	it.	And	they’re	at	an	advantage	to	work	against	you,	not	with	you,	when	
you’re	trying	to	really	refresh	your	memory	and	work	out	what	really	happened.	
I’m	saying,	‘I	don’t	remember	that,	but	if	you’re	saying	this	is	what	the	judge	said	
it	must	have	happened	because	I	can’t	remember’.	
	
John	found	 it	unnerving	 that	program	staff	had	more	 information	than	he	did	about	himself.19	
Information	is	power,	made	explicit	by	the	use	of	the	official	narrative	as	a	disciplinary	tool	(see	
Crewe	2009).	Here	the	prisoner,	without	having	access	to	it,	must	enact	the	version	of	himself	
and	 the	 offence	 that	 is	 present	 in	 the	 accounts	 of	 court	 and	 correctional	 authorities.	 Another	
former	inmate,	Ben,	who	went	through	the	same	program	as	Matty	(writing	an	autobiography),	
expressed	anger	because	he	had	no	control	over	where	the	document	ended	up.	He	explained	to	
Rossmanith:	
	
[I	 asked	 them]	what	 are	you	going	 to	do	with	 it?	 [They	 say],	 ‘Oh	no,	we	give	 it	
straight	back	 [to	 you]’.	 Bullshit.	 You	 take	 it	 into	 that	 room,	 you	 read	 it.	Do	you	
photocopy	 [it]?	 [They	 say],	 ‘Oh	 no,	 we	 promise	 we	 don’t	 photocopy	 it’.	 I	 still,	
today,	don’t	believe	it.	They	have	to	have	some	sort	of	record	or	history,	I	don’t	
know.	
	
The	prisoner’s	story	comes	to	represent	a	sort	of	cultural	meme	that	will	never	really	‘belong’	to	
that	offender.	Much	 like	 the	 imposed	narratives	of	 the	police,	prosecution	and	the	courts,	 this	
has	 the	 effect	 of	 seriously	 re‐scripting	 offenders’	 life	 stories,	 thereby	 compromising	 their	
capacity	to	form	self‐narratives	with	which	they	can	identify.		
	
Conclusion	
In	this	article	we	have	shown	how	the	pressure	on	the	offender	to	‘give	good	narrative’	can	be	
traced	 through	 the	development	of	 the	official	 legal	 narrative	of	 the	offence,	 and	 through	 the	
development	 of	 a	 psychosocial	 narrative	 in	 prison	 that	 will	 enable	 the	 prisoner	 to	 negotiate	
conditional	 release.	 The	 way	 this	 narrative	 is	 attached	 (sutured)	 to	 the	 offender	 highlights	
offenders’	 lack	of	 agency	 in	 the	presentation	of	 personal	 and	offence	data.	Personal	details	of	
motivation	and	life	history	are	presented	in	a	format	that	suits	the	legal	purpose.		
	
The	way	 judicial	officers	and	parole	decision‐makers	 receive	and	 interpret	 the	 information	 in	
turn	shapes	 the	way	 this	 information	 is	presented.	The	co‐creation	of	 the	story	of	 the	offence	
and	the	offender	continues	throughout	the	sentence.	His	story	will	always	be	told	in	compliance	
with	the	institutional	limitations	of	the	form	of	information	presentation	set	up	by	the	rules	of	
evidence	and	the	psycho‐correctional	apparatus.	This	article	has	shown	how	the	expectation	to	
provide	an	acceptable	narrative	can	obscure	and	distort	offenders’	abilities	to	display	the	types	
of	remorseful	and	redemptive	behaviour	expected	of	them.	
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1	 The	words	used	 to	 describe	 the	 subjects	 of	 criminal	 justice	 dispositions	depend	on	 the	 stage	 of	 the	proceedings	
being	examined.	In	this	paper,	the	term	‘offender’	is	used	as	a	descriptor,	and	‘defendant’	is	used	for	those	who	have	
not	yet	been	convicted.	‘Prisoner’	and	‘inmate’	are	used	interchangeably	to	describe	those	who	have	been	convicted	
and	sentenced	to	a	term	of	imprisonment.	
2	We	have	elected	to	use	the	male	pronoun	throughout	this	paper,	as	only	male	prisoners	were	interviewed.	Women	
suffer	 from	particular	disadvantage	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	and	 this	paper	does	not	 address	 their	 specific	
concerns.	
3	This	account	is	drawn	from	Kate	Rossmanith’s	fieldwork.	
4	This	account	is	drawn	from	Maggie	Hall’s	fieldwork.	
5	Information	which	could	identify	participants	has	been	changed.		
6	 Pseudonyms	are	used	 for	offenders.	While	 several	 judges	 and	 lawyers	 interviewed	were	willing	 to	be	 identified,	
most	were	not,	so	participants	have	been	de‐identified.		
7	 In	 her	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 police	 interviews,	 Kate	 Haworth	 uses	 Watson’s	 distinction	 between	 invited	 and	
uninvited	 stories:	 ‘the	 teller	 of	 an	 invited	 story	 has	 to	 tell	 the	 story	 the	 recipient	wants	 and	 has	 asked	 to	 hear’	
(Haworth	2009:	40).		
8	 In	 the	 small	minority	 of	 cases	where	 there	 is	 a	plea	of	 not	 guilty	 (more	 likely	where	 the	 offence	 is	 serious),	 the	
narrative	of	 the	offence	 is	contained	 in	the	trial	 transcript,	and	where	a	guilty	verdict	results,	summarised	 in	the	
sentencing	comments	of	the	judge.	
9	We	refer	here	to	sentencing	matters,	which	comprise	the	bulk	of	criminal	court	processes.	During	trials,	defendants	
often	 only	 ‘speak’	 through	 their	 legal	 representative.	 Mostly,	 however,	 people	 plead	 guilty	 and	 the	matter	 goes	
straight	to	sentence.		
10	McClellan	CJ	at	CL,	Fullerton	J,	McCallum	J,	Butters	v	R	[2010]	NSW	CCA	1	at	para	[16]	and	para	[18].	
11	Drawing	on	an	analysis	of	the	judicial	discourse	about	remorse	in	178	Canadian	cases,	Weisman	(2009)	examines	
how	judicial	speech	shapes	the	form	that	expressions	of	remorse	are	expected	to	take.	
12	 Hall	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 the	 aims	 of	 sentencing	 must	 be	 operationalised	 by	 the	 prisoner	 by	 demonstrating	 or	
performing	 that	 they	 are	 punished,	 denounced,	 aware	 of	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 victim,	 rehabilitated,	 deterred	 etc.	
Defence	counsel	must	therefore	instruct	their	clients	accordingly,	while	keeping	in	mind	that	spontaneity	is	highly	
valued.	
13	For	a	fuller	account	of	this	interview,	see	Rossmanith	2014.	
14	Frank	refers	to	what	he	calls	 ‘narrative	ambush’:	 ‘Vital,	breathing	stories	can	break	through	the	filters	and	grids.	
Stories	can	make	themselves	heard	whether	or	not	they	fit	a	narrative	habitus’	(2010:	59).	
15	Tellingly,	the	way	that	a	prisoner’s	parole	date	is	expressed	is	now	‘Earliest	Possible	Release	Date’.	
16	In	addition,	the	types	of	narratives	commonly	produced	by	prisoners	and	previously	viewed	as	evidence	of	denial	
and	 lack	of	 remorse	are	 increasingly	being	 reconceptualised	as	an	all	 too	human	attempt	 to	 regain	a	measure	of	
moral	self‐worth	 in	an	environment	where	 ‘the	prison	positions	prisoners	as	unethical	others	 in	need	of	change’	
(Ugelvik	2012:	273).	
17	Cognitive	behavioural	therapy	is	the	most	widely	used	treatment	in	both	general	and	correctional	psychology	and	
usually	consists	of	a	short	series	of	learning	based	sessions	focused	on	changing	behaviour.	
18	CUBIT	stands	for	Custody	Based	Intensive	Treatment	program	for	serious	sex	offenders.	
19	Hall	(2014)	has	argued	that	prisoners	have	difficulty	getting	hold	of	the	official	record	of	their	sentencing	and	other	
important	documents	such	as	risk	assessment.	
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